SHADA

Société Haïtiano-Américaine de Développement Agricole (SHADA) was financed by the Export-Import Bank in Washington, which granted a $5 million loan in the fall of 1941, later supplemented by $7 million in U.S. credit in November 1942. The project aimed to develop rubber plants. President Élie Lescot saw it as an opportunity to demonstrate support for Pan-Americanism and the Allied cause, believing it was a step towards the modernization of Haiti. He promoted it as a government-sponsored organization that provided a “big push for Haitian agricultural development”, with annual profits intended for the amortization of the national debt and development of needed resources. The government paper, Le Continental, expressed optimism, viewing collaboration with the USA as beneficial for Haiti in searching for “the secret of democracy”.

The general manager of SHADA was Thomas A. Fennell, a U.S. agronomist who had previously served as an agricultural advisor in Haiti. Dartigue was the vice-president. A team of U.S. technicians worked with Fennell. The project commenced production in Haiti in 1941. The contract negotiated with the U.S. government in 1941 granted SHADA free rein in its activities and provided it with ample military support. SHADA settled on large tracts of land, initially in the northern countryside, eventually spreading across the country. By 1943, an estimated 47,177 acres were cleared for planting cryptostegia.

SHADA would eventually claim jurisdiction over 100,000 hectares of land. The project utilized a large labor force, mostly peasant farmers lured away from food crop cultivation. One proposal that was pursued was the cultivation of subsistence crops, particularly in the Artibonite valley, where the local food economy had significantly decreased since the introduction of SHADA, and where anti-U.S. sentiment was highest. The United States also initiated a massive public relations campaign to promote the project, including an international newsletter that often featured positive reports, large revenue projections, and photographs.

Despite official expectations, the process of rubber cultivation was troublesome from the beginning. To gain access to Haiti’s most arable land, peasant families were forcibly removed. The company invested considerably in trying to get rubber from hevea trees, but this produced fewer yields than hoped. The destruction that accompanied the project raised considerable resentment among government officials. Vice-president Dartigue, while publicly supportive, was alarmed by the measures taken, especially in Jérémie, where nearly a million fruit-bearing trees were cut down and peasant houses were invaded or razed. Dartigue implored Fennell to understand “the mentality and legitimate interests of the Haitian peasant and city dwellers,” arguing that failure to do so would increase hostility towards the company. He submitted a twelve-point proposal for land acquisition and peasant relocation.

By May 1944, all sides agreed the rubber project was a failure. Rubber was never produced in significant quantities for large export. A severe drought in 1943–1944 also resulted in a bad harvest and low yields. Additionally, there was increasing pressure in the U.S. Congress from oil interests lobbying for petroleum-based synthetic rubber. The Allied victory in France in June 1944 prompted a reevaluation of wartime programs. A U.S. military attaché’s survey concluded that SHADA’s operations were done at a considerable expense to the American taxpayer and in a manner that does not command respect of the Haitian people. A 1944 report recommended the project’s immediate termination and the gradual return of displaced lands to the peasants. Fennell left for Puerto Rico, and processing was discontinued in most locations, although some sisal manufacturing continued.