Curacao and its neighbours sold on more people than they kept

Aruba, Bonaire and Curacao are dry islands with little ground worth planting. The Dutch used them for something else. Between 1641 and 1863 they worked as a transfer point. Ships from West Central Africa and the Gold Coast unloaded there, and more than one hundred thousand people were then shipped onward to other American markets, chiefly the Spanish mainland around the Caribbean and the Guianas. Some captives stayed on the islands. The business was re-export. The vessels were fitted out at Amsterdam, Middelburg and Vlissingen, and the islands gave Dutch merchants a legal foothold inside a Caribbean carved into empires that formally forbade each other's trade. A Spanish colony barred from buying in Africa could buy at Curacao. This is the commercial logic that later made free ports useful to everybody, and it is why the Caribbean, on paper a set of sealed imperial systems, in practice moved goods, people and news across every border it had.

A Dutch fleet sent from Brazil captured Luanda in August 1641 and held it for seven years. Nzinga, who had gone to Luanda in person in 1623 to offer peace and trade and had been fighting the Portuguese since, suddenly had a powerful and unexpected ally. In Kongo, Garcia II came to the throne the same year, and his reign to 1661 was the last stretch of effective Kongo unity. In 1645, while Portugal was tied up in war with Spain and Angola was under Dutch occupation, the first Capuchin mission slipped into Kongo over Portuguese objections. In 1648 Salvador Correia de Sa was sent from Brazil to drive the Dutch out, and the Portuguese came back to Luanda intent on subduing the kingdom that had backed their enemies. Nzinga did not negotiate again until 1656. By her death in 1663 Matamba had become a major broker in the slave trade.

France declared sovereignty over western Hispaniola in 1664. The declaration covered a place French settlers and buccaneers had already been living in for decades, so the novelty lay in the claim rather than in the occupation. Spain rejected it. Madrid had held the island since Columbus and regarded every French farm on it as a trespass, and thirty three years passed before Spanish recognition came in a European peace treaty. Through those years the French planted, imported captives, and fought. The ground in question is the western third of the island, and it became Saint-Domingue. By the 1780s that strip of land was producing more wealth than any comparable territory on earth, more sugar and coffee than all the British West Indies together, and every unit of it was produced by people carried across the Atlantic in chains. A claim made on paper in 1664 is the legal ancestor of that arrangement.

In 1848 the budget of the Haitian army stood at 3,232,225 francs, which came to sixty five per cent of everything the national government spent. Faustin Soulouque was in his second year as president and would crown himself emperor the following year. The figure is worth setting beside what the state did not do. It ran almost no schools outside the towns, maintained few roads, and drew most of its revenue from a tax on coffee grown by farmers it otherwise left alone. No European power was preparing to land. France had recognised Haitian independence in 1825 and the threat that justified this spending had passed a generation earlier. The army existed at that size because control of it was the route to the presidency, and every president had to pay for the loyalty that had put him there and could remove him. Two thirds of public money went to the one institution that decided who governed.