Leclerc lands with orders that never mention slavery

General Victoire Leclerc landed with ten thousand troops whose numbers soon doubled, under orders to proceed stealthily, win over the black generals where possible, disarm their soldiers and eventually deport all black officers. Geggus notes the orders said nothing about slavery, and that Leclerc published Bonaparte's assurances that emancipation was inviolable. Unsure what the French meant and unwilling to lose the property they had gained, several generals and most of the population stood aside, which left Toussaint, Christophe and Dessalines fighting a hopeless campaign of burning, hostage-killing and retreat into the mountains. Massive numbers of experienced troops arriving in the healthy winter months brought rapid European success, and Toussaint's surrender in May ended the first phase. He was deported on suspicion of plotting, while the other generals were absorbed into the army of occupation and used to disarm the rural population.

With the French expedition days from landing and still convinced that Jefferson wholeheartedly supported its mission, Secretary of State Madison instructed the American commercial agent at Cap to adopt a policy of strict neutrality. Girard spells out what the phrase meant in practice. The agent was to make no effort to combat American contraband reaching the rebels. The misunderstanding, he writes, created much acrimony after the French landing, and it fits his larger argument that the expedition's supply arrangements were built on assurances that quietly dissolved. Jefferson's second thoughts had come too late to matter for the sailing, since the largest squadron in the French navy was already preparing to leave Brest and Bonaparte would never have accepted the independence of the most valuable French colony under Anglo-American tutelage. Girard reads the episode as the first sign that the supply arrangements underpinning the whole expedition rested on promises no one intended to police.

The rest of the Guadeloupe flotilla carried on north and reached New York in August 1802 with twelve hundred and eighty four prisoners spread across its ships. The French naval officers described their errand in official language. The mayor of the city was not persuaded, wrote about the great number of black men held aboard the frigate Consolante, and refused permission to land. What happened next was never recorded in one place. Some of the captives died of dysentery in the harbour. Some got ashore and vanished. Some were sold in the United States in defiance of the law. The Consolante had arrived with three hundred people aboard and sailed for Guadeloupe with one hundred and eighty. Four other ships went on to Brest and delivered eight hundred prisoners nobody had managed to sell. Asked why so many names were missing from the rolls, the officers told the minister of the navy that many had died during the crossing.

Thomas uses the Logan Bill of 1806 as the test of his argument, and the test is the timing. Under Toussaint, stability and a refusal to declare independence had calmed the fears of the southern planter class and preserved American support. Dessalines's open declaration in 1804 and the violence he carried out against the remaining white planters tipped the balance against American tolerance of the emancipation threat, and the embargo legislation followed. The mechanism Thomas describes is a slaveholding republic reacting to the demonstration effect rather than to Haitian conduct abroad. He notes that Jefferson's position had moved repeatedly across two decades, that the prospect of Louisiana settlement would have nearly doubled American plantation capacity, and that Jefferson sided with economic interest in weighing the value of slavery to the southern economy.