A travelling tribunal in Martinique burns the convicted where they stand

In October 1803 Captain General Louis Thomas Villaret-Joyeuse set up a special tribunal in Martinique to try three offences together: poisoning, arson, and running away by stealing canoes. It sat between the first and second British occupations of the island, in the middle of the Napoleonic wars, and it built on the precedent of 1753, when the colony had first given poison cases their own rules. The tribunal travelled, its members were government officials and prominent local slaveholders, and the executions, usually burning at the stake, took place on the spot as soon as a trial ended. There was no appeal. Within two years Villaret-Joyeuse was reporting that the blight of poisonings was in retreat thanks to the court. The trials ran on until the British landed in February 1809, and the incoming British governor kept both the tribunal and the leading part local slaveholders played in it.

On 6 January 1805 General Jean Louis Ferrand, commanding the French remnant in Santo Domingo, issued an order sanctioning the seizure and enslavement of Haitians. Haiti had declared independence one year earlier. Jean Jacques Dessalines answered in February with an expedition of twenty thousand men against Santo Domingo city, which failed when a French naval squadron under Admiral Missiessy arrived at the right moment and the British declined to help him. In an address to his citizens on 12 April 1805 Dessalines named Ferrand's decree as a reason for the invasion, accused the Spanish side of assisting French designs, and told Haitians to live or die as free people. He had copies of the January order distributed so that people could read it themselves. Emilio Cordero Michel later argued that the decree was indeed the main cause of the campaign, since it showed that Ferrand intended to retake Haiti and restore slavery there as he had in the east.

Dessalines's second in command, the mixed race officer Nicolas Geffrard, opened his own channel to the Spanish governor of Santiago de Cuba. The letter is notable for its polished style and its learned references to Roman antiquity, describing Rochambeau as a genius more inventive than Nero, Caligula and Heliogabalus. Its diplomacy was practical. It stressed common ground between the two islands by recalling that mixed race exiles from the revolution had found peaceful refuge in Cuba a few years earlier, and it promised not to carry the slave revolt to Cuban shores, a shrewd concession given how much Spanish policy turned on security fears. Girard reads the use of lighter skinned officers as intermediaries as a deliberate accommodation of the racial prejudices of the men being addressed, and as a continuation of Louverture's diplomatic methods.

Thomas uses the Logan Bill of 1806 as the test of his argument, and the test is the timing. Under Toussaint, stability and a refusal to declare independence had calmed the fears of the southern planter class and preserved American support. Dessalines's open declaration in 1804 and the violence he carried out against the remaining white planters tipped the balance against American tolerance of the emancipation threat, and the embargo legislation followed. The mechanism Thomas describes is a slaveholding republic reacting to the demonstration effect rather than to Haitian conduct abroad. He notes that Jefferson's position had moved repeatedly across two decades, that the prospect of Louisiana settlement would have nearly doubled American plantation capacity, and that Jefferson sided with economic interest in weighing the value of slavery to the southern economy.