Lescot's marriage laws were an attempt to keep peasants on the land

The Haitian legislation of 1944 and 1945 on marriage and legitimacy rested on women's childbearing, their sexual arrangements and their work on the land. Elie Lescot expected that lifting the marriage tax and the illegitimacy bar would produce more civil weddings and more children entitled to inherit. A child with a claim on a family plot would stay in the rural districts and take the plot up when the recognised father died. That held the agricultural workforce in place at a moment when Haiti needed export crops and had just watched its largest agricultural venture collapse. Sanders Johnson reads the whole package as land policy delivered in the language of morality. The president spoke about honourable partnerships and Christian households. What the statutes regulated was where Haitians lived, whose children could hold ground, and how many workers would still be standing in the countryside when the next foreign contract arrived.

Fighting on African soil was confined to a narrow strip of Mediterranean coast. Italian forces crossed from Libya into Egypt in the late summer of 1940 and were driven back into Libya by a small British force. The arrival of the German Afrika Korps changed the position completely, and for a time the drive toward the Suez Canal looked impossible to stop. Egyptian nationalists grew restless and feeling against the British hardened. Then the British held the Germans at El Alamein in October 1942, and the canal was safe for the empire for the time being. The threat that lasted was the Egyptian one, which outlived Rommel by more than a decade. British and Australian troops pushed the Germans west toward Tunisia. At the far end of the Mediterranean an American army came ashore in Morocco and Algeria, which put an end to the ambiguous standing of the Vichy administration there. The two forces closed on Tunisia from both sides and put the last Axis soldiers off the continent in May 1943.

In February 1944 Francois Duvalier published an article on the stadial evolution of Vodou in the bulletin of Haiti's Bureau of Ethnology. In it he credited Jean Price Mars with proclaiming to the Society of History and Geography what he called an essential truth: that 1804 issued from Vodou. His own reasoning, he added, had been bound to arrive at the same conclusion. Duvalier was then a doctor and an ethnologist, thirteen years away from the presidency. The formula compressed the whole indigenist reading of Haitian independence into a slogan, and it gave the future dictatorship a claim on the religion of the majority and on the founding event of the country in one move. Once in power he presented himself as a spiritual father and encouraged the identification. The intellectual equipment was assembled well before there was a regime to use it.

Constitutions in 1942 and 1946 allowed direct elections to a legislative council in the Gold Coast, which made organised parties worth forming. The United Gold Coast Convention was founded in 1947 under J. B. Danquah, a lawyer from a small professional elite. It was moderate, it stayed inside the law, and it worked by persuading colonial officials that reform was reasonable. The British were content with it. Younger activists with no property and no patience found nothing there for them. Kwame Nkrumah came back from the United States in 1947 to work for the Convention, having spent years in pan-Africanist politics abroad, and the rioting and shortages of those months made Danquah's method look useless to him. He left in 1949 and founded the Convention People's Party. Its method, taken in part from Gandhi in India, was called positive action: strikes and boycotts, non-violent, and willing to break colonial law. The British ran out of patience and arrested Nkrumah in 1950 along with several other leaders, on the theory that jailing a man puts away his argument with him.