She designs a method no visitor could pick up in a single season

Comhaire-Sylvain called for a study of Haitian society that drew on several disciplines at once. She was candid that such an approach would not be easy to use, and that it would be no use at all to someone without long experience in the country, because the sources were scattered, uncoordinated and full of holes. She wanted it anyway, on the evidence: her figures showed plainly that stratification in urban Haiti was far more complicated than earlier writers had described. Her criticism was aimed at the thick descriptions produced by visiting ethnographers, work that set out to see everything and, in trying, saw less than it could have. She did not name Herskovits, Hurston, Metraux or Mintz. She did not have to. The people who had made careers describing Haiti to foreign readers were being told by a Haitian woman with two decades of local fieldwork that their instruments were too coarse to pick up the country they thought they had explained.

Brussels intended to hold the Congo. Local elections in 1957 and 1958 were meant to satisfy the demand for reform, and instead they gave Congolese politics a structure it had lacked. Nationalist parties multiplied. The broadest of them formed around Patrice Lumumba, who in most respects was the only Congolese leader trying to build an organisation covering the entire territory rather than one region or one ethnic base. Political rallies in 1958 and 1959 turned into riots and the violence spread. The Belgians started losing control. They had delayed elections too long to manage the transition on their own terms or even in an orderly way. The colony had been run first as Leopold's personal estate and then as Belgium's, and it entered independence with almost no trained administrators and no political machinery of its own. The chaos that swallowed the Congo after 1960 was already implied in the way the last three years were handled.

Changes to United States immigration law after 1965 encouraged millions of Caribbean immigrants to come, and the decades that followed produced substantial educational and economic gains among them. Shared ideas about equality had already given way to the American civil rights movement and to Caribbean independence in the 1960s, so the new arrivals entered a country that had just rewritten its own rules. Some historians and sociologists point to Caribbean advances that run ahead of those of African Americans and read them as a breach in the diaspora unity of the earlier twentieth century. The comparison is contested. Winston James argued against it in 2002, examining Afro Caribbean social mobility in the United States and rejecting the standard explanation built on it. What is not in dispute is the scale. A region that had been sending tens of thousands began sending millions, and cities from New York to Miami were remade.

On 28 July 1958 three officers dismissed from the army and driven into exile, Captain Alix Pasquet and Lieutenants Philippe Dominique and Henry Perpignan, attacked in Port-au-Prince. The next day a militia answerable to Francois Duvalier alone was constituted. It took over from the hooded squads the regime had already been using to silence opponents. Recruited from civilians of the poor classes, it became the body known officially as the Volunteers of National Security and popularly as the tontons macoutes. The American doctrine of national security, current in those Cold War years, served the same regime twice, first as an argument for military aid from Washington and then as cover for an order of terror. The army was purged, weakened and broken in. Its weapons came under the direct control of the president. It had to live alongside a second armed body that existed to limit its privileges and to make any move against the regime unworkable.