Aristide keeps his promise to go and Preval wins on a quarter turnout

Lavalas took seventy-one of eighty-three seats in the parliamentary elections at the end of September 1995. Washington had by then spent close to six hundred million dollars in Haiti and cut its garrison to two thousand soldiers. Pressure built for Aristide to claim the three years he spent in exile as time owed to his term, and he said nothing for weeks while forty-five percent of his budget arrived from foreign donors. In November his cousin, the deputy Jean-Hubert Feuille, was shot dead after leaving the palace. At the funeral Aristide told his followers to go into the districts of big houses and heavy weapons and disarm the people living there, and reminded the assembled diplomats that Haiti had one head of state. Houses burned, a radio station was attacked, and the gourde fell sixteen percent. On 27 November he confirmed he would leave on 7 February 1996. Rene Preval, an agronomist and bakery owner trained in Belgium, won the December election with eighty-eight percent of a twenty-eight percent turnout.

In the Dominican presidential election of 1994 supporters of Joaquin Balaguer and national media outlets circulated pictures meant to fix the figure of the Haitian onto his opponent Jose Francisco Pena Gomez. One showed a destitute migrant with exaggerated lips crossing the frontier while a large white hand held him back. Another showed the Dominican side of Hispaniola with white feet running away from the black feet of the Haitian side. A third had Pena Gomez pointing and promising to order the country set on fire if he were assassinated. A fourth showed him dancing with Haitian supporters under a caption in misspelled Creole while Dominicans knelt beside them, one of them gagged. The fifth put his face over a map of the island dotted with Haitian faces, with a caption saying he hated the Dominican Republic over the 1937 massacre of Haitians and of his parents, that Clinton and the European countries would back him, and that he was not black, he was Haitian.

The court orders that stopped repatriation left the United States holding thousands of Haitians and no plan for them. Within three days of the first restraining order people were being taken to Camp Bulkeley, a remote corner of the naval station at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and housed in permanent shelters and tents. Bulkeley was small. Within a week navy construction battalions were putting up a far larger tent city on the abandoned airfield at McCalla for the nearly five thousand others coming off the cutters. Meanwhile the district court turned its restraining order into an injunction, the appeals court dissolved it, and the sequence repeated until the legal shape of the border had been redrawn seven times in a little over a month. Some order or other held the ships back for about six weeks. Guantanamo answered the government's problem. People could be kept there without entering the United States, on ground leased from Cuba, in a place lawyers for the government said American courts could not reach.

War in independent Africa has generally been internal, and armies have crossed borders rarely. The exceptions matter. Ethiopia and Somalia fought over the Ogaden in 1963 and 1964 and again in 1977 and 1978. In 1979 a Tanzanian army marched into Uganda and removed Idi Amin. After the Cold War ended, foreign military ventures increased again. Angola and the Congo became free for alls in the 1990s, with several regional powers protecting their interests and taking what mineral wealth they could reach. The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 2000 was the largest conventional war anywhere in the world at that moment, fought with mass mobilisation and trenches over borders, identity and regional standing. West African troops in Sierra Leone and African Union deployments elsewhere turned peacekeeping into a business with political returns. At the same time governments arm insurgencies next door, Rwandans and Ugandans in the Congo, Chadians and Eritreans in Darfur, Eritreans in Somalia. Armies have become instruments of foreign policy as much as of internal control.