Haiti buys back the bonds and American control of its money ends

Munro follows the financial thread to its end, long after the soldiers left. A new agreement in 1941 abolished the office of fiscal representative and passed most of its functions to the National Bank of Haiti, reorganised with three American and three Haitian directors and an American manager. Nearly eight million dollars of the 1922 bonds were still outstanding, because low coffee prices and later the war in Europe had led the government to suspend all but token sinking fund payments after 1938. Six million were still outstanding in 1947 when the Haitian government redeemed them at par with the proceeds of an internal loan. At that point the United States ceased to have any responsibility for Haiti's foreign debt. Munro closes by conceding that neither the treaty organisation nor its successors did much about poverty or illiteracy. Where this account departs from the standard one: Presents the intervention as for a time the most successful of the American Caribbean protectorates, and frames Haitian nationalist pressure as obstruction rather than resistance.

Casimir argues that the two measures Bonaparte's government could not carry out have become operational again by other means. The first, destroying the working population's resource base, he traces through the twentieth century. The second, deporting the non-conforming French-oriented Haitians, has turned into an exodus. It began as voluntary exile with the 1946 Revolution, accelerated in the 1960s during Francois Duvalier's reign, and from the 1980s onward became an uncontrollable outflow of qualified and semi-qualified personnel. At the level of the masses, the departure of boat people looks to neighbouring territories, and even to the larger countries of North America, like a threat of significant proportions. His conclusion is that the state can no longer retain even its own oligarchy, and that the extinction Napoleon wanted by force is now burning on a low flame.

The oldest movement in sub-Saharan Africa that can fairly be called nationalist was at the southern end of the continent. The South African Native National Congress was founded in 1912 and became the African National Congress in 1923. Elsewhere, politics on the scale of a whole territory was rare before the Second World War. It worked in small colonies that resembled a precolonial state, and it worked in Tanganyika, where Swahili was spoken widely enough to carry a message from one end to the other. The Tanganyikan African Association was founded in 1929 with branches across the territory. The war pushed matters forward through hardship and sharpened political awareness. Colonial schooling, restricted as it was, produced elites who meant to build European style nation states in Africa and who then had to close the distance between themselves and everybody else. Women organised and campaigned, and were promised an equality that independence did not deliver. Nationalism had to supply an identity for peoples a European mapmaker had grouped together. It usually failed.

Dumarsais Estime became president of Haiti in 1946 under the slogan of a black man in power. He had been a deputy under Sthenio Vincent and under Elie Lescot, he was the son of large landowners in the Artibonite, and he was married into an old mulatto family. The economy helped him. Postwar markets lifted coffee and sisal, exports doubled, tourism brought in foreign currency, and the budget rose from twelve to twenty one million dollars between 1946 and 1949. In that setting the noiriste argument appeared to be demonstrating its own usefulness. A substantial black section of the bureaucracy took shape and allied itself with the traditional fractions of the bourgeoisie of every shade, strengthening them. The black petty bourgeoisie expanded in the liberal professions, in small commerce and in the civil service. Reforms were announced for the peasantry and the working class and nothing changed for them. Repression of the unions and the left followed later.