The Maitland agreement turns British defeat into a monopoly

Thomas rates the Maitland agreement of 1798 as monumental in its effects. The protection from privateering that all parties offered produced a marked increase in trade, and virtually overnight British and American ships were crowding the ports of Saint Domingue, with competition between foreign merchants lowering the prices of imports and raising those of exports. The mechanism Thomas emphasises is exclusivity. The agreement applied to Toussaint personally, which gave him insurmountable leverage inside the domestic power structure, and a clause specified that the signatories would not involve themselves in the form of government the colony chose. Thomas reads that clause as tacit recognition in the New World and as a measure of how far Britain would go in its quarrel with France, since British agitation now ran through the sovereignty of the colony rather than against it.

The colonial jurist Moreau de Saint-Mery set out a scale of eleven colour classes for Saint-Domingue. Pure white and pure black each stood at one hundred and twenty eight parts. The sacatra carried sixteen white parts, the griffe thirty two, the marabou forty eight, the mulatto sixty four, the quarteron ninety six, the metif one hundred and twelve, the mameluc one hundred and twenty, the quarteronne one hundred and twenty four, the sang mele one hundred and twenty six. Anyone with fewer than eight white parts was a negro. The scale ran one way only. Any recorded black ancestry kept a person out of the white category permanently. Moreau also counted how many parental combinations could produce each rank, twenty for the quarteron, twelve for the mulatto, none at all for the two extremes. He observed that children came out in places his arithmetic had not predicted, and he observed in passing that the eye of prejudice did the sorting.

Roume had sent Devaux and then Sasportas to Curacao with narrow instructions: recruit privateers for the Jamaica operation and nothing else. Girard quotes the order to think only of Jamaica, and he uses it to knock down the claim by Loker and others that the pair were meant to start a slave revolt on the Dutch island. Curacao looked promising because the Netherlands was allied to France and the island held several hundred French residents and a thousand Jews, many of them Sasportas relatives on his mother's side. Their sympathies were another matter, since Jewish owners held roughly a sixth of the island's enslaved people. Devaux exceeded his brief and conspired against Governor Lauffer, who arrested both men and shipped them back to Saint-Domingue. Lauffer never published the secret instructions he seized, which is why the setback did not end the plan. Where this account departs from the standard one: Against Loker and others, Girard argues the Curacao mission was about hiring privateers and was never an attempt to raise a slave revolt there.

Naval war with Britain had destroyed the French merchant fleet, leaving Saint-Domingue dependent on American shipping, so when Congress embargoed French colonies in retaliation for privateering the colony's export economy stopped. Louverture wrote to Adams expressing surprise and sadness that American vessels had abandoned his ports, and sent Joseph Bunel to carry the letter and argue the case. Girard notes that Louverture staffed his civil administration almost entirely with white secretaries, priests, merchants and clerks, since Black and mixed-race men dominated the army, and that sending a white envoy to a slaveholding republic was ordinary politics rather than an anomaly. Bunel met Secretary of State Pickering and a congressional delegation from South Carolina, then dined with Adams. Pickering, describing the mission in his correspondence, identified Louverture as the Black commander in chief and called Bunel merely a messenger, saying nothing of his colour.